

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

JONATHAN MUNDO,

Case No.: 2:24-cv-02279-APG-NJK

Plaintiff

Order

V.

JAMES DZURENDÁ, et al.,

Defendants

9 Plaintiff Jonathan Mundo brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No.
10 1-1. On March 1, 2025, I ordered Mundo to file an amended complaint by April 4, 2025. ECF
11 No. 8. I warned Mundo that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended
12 complaint by that deadline. *Id.* at 8. That deadline expired, and Mundo did not file an amended
13 complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond.

I. Discussion

District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case.

17 *Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles*, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may
18 dismiss an action based on a party's failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. *See*
19 *Carey v. King*, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply
20 with local rule requiring *pro se* plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); *Malone v. U.S.*
21 *Postal Service*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court
22 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider:
23 (1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its

1 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of
2 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. *See In re*
3 *Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Malone*,
4 833 F.2d at 130).

5 The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the
6 court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Mundo's claims. The third
7 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption
8 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the
9 court or prosecuting an action. *See Anderson v. Air West*, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The
10 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly
11 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

12 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to
13 correct the party's failure that brought about the court's need to consider dismissal. *See Yourish*
14 *v. Cal. Amplifier*, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic
15 alternatives *before* the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); *accord*
16 *Pagtalunan v. Galaza*, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive
17 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives
18 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” *i.e.*, like the “initial
19 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have
20 been “eroded” by *Yourish*). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before
21 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” *Henderson v.*
22 *Duncan*, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed
23 until and unless Mundo files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second

1 order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only
2 delays the inevitable and squanders the court's finite resources. The circumstances here do not
3 indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Mundo needs additional time or
4 evidence that he did not receive the screening order. Setting another deadline is not a
5 meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. Having
6 thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of dismissal.

7 **II. Conclusion**

8 I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on
9 Mundo's failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with my March 1, 2025, order. The
10 Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other
11 documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Mundo wishes to pursue his claims, he must
12 file a complaint in a new case.

13 I FURTHER ORDER that Mundo's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* (ECF No.
14 7) is DENIED as moot.

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16 Dated: April 29, 2025



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18 Andrew P. Gordon
19 Chief United States District Judge
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